1.2
The duo's latest intervention followed the launch of a program for Cyprus. 3 The Cypriot banking system was eight times the size of the island's economy and tottering on the brink from exposure to Greece. As a condition of financing the government, Europe insisted that bank depositors pay a burden-sharing "tax." The tax would contain the crisis in the banking sector and spare the holders of government bonds. The announcement would showcase Europe's commitment to share losses with private creditors, and to break the bond between banks and national governments.
1.3
It took three pages in Lee Buchheit's trademark font to demolish the plan and lay out an alternative. What came to be called "the botched Cyprus bailout" was doomed from the start: after paying the deposit tax, people would have pulled the rest of their savings, brought down the banking system and forced the government to intervene on a much larger scale. Buchheit and Gulati instead proposed to extend uninsured deposits over EUR100, 000 into five and ten-year certificates of deposit, and to reschedule EUR8.2 billion in government debt. This combination would have filled more than half of the program financing gap without touching the insured depositors. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235359.
1.4
Their prescription flowed from the insight that governments and financial systems are communicating vessels: strength or weakness in one flows to the other, and back. My essay elaborates the implications of this insight. I consider the bank-government link in recent financial crises. It is far from unique to Europe, though it does not always result in feedback effects, or the "doom loop," which has made headlines of late. As capital movements have become more rapid and global, the abiding connection between banks and governments has turned destructive. The policy goal is to reduce the risk of destruction and harness the connection in the name of financial stability. In conclusion, I suggest several policy implications and avenues for further research.
I. Far from Europe

1.5
On January 27, 2011, Standard & Poor's downgraded Japan's government debt, which then stood at nearly double the size of the Japanese economy. 4 The Prime Minister apparently learned about the downgrade from a foreign journalist. His flub instantly became iconicbut it was also overblown: the downgrade had little meaning for most of Japan's creditors. For regulated domestic financial institutions, holding almost 70% of Japanese government bonds, for government pension funds, and for the Japanese central bank, there were few practical consequences from the S&P pronouncement. At the extreme, the value of the debt to these creditors was a function of regulatory say-so, and their prospects of repayment a function of domestic politics. Only foreigners, holding just over 5%, might have had reason to listen to S&P. 5
1.6
This anecdote is at once happy, sad, and symptomatic of an old relationship at the heart of modern finance. It is about banks and governments, which are both inseparable and doomed to bring each other down. On the bright side, they are each other's indispensable safety net. On the dark side, government debt default can ravage financial systems, and banking crises can bring down governments.
1.7
Until recently, bank and government debt problems were seen as related, but distinct. Banking crises were bad for the economy and hence for public finances. short on funds have turned to banks since time immemorial, which did not imply the death of regulated institutions, nor the start of a self-destructive spiral. Bank and government debt crises traveled along distinct paths, required different prophylactic measures ex ante and different solutions ex post. For modern banks, solvency regulation has been the principal bulwark against failure; resolution the principal way to limit collateral damage from failure. For governments, fiscal fiscal prudence has been the accepted prophylactic; adjustment (belttightening) and debt restructuring, the standard solutions.
1.8
The five case studies below reveal the blurry boundary between bank and government crises. In Asia, Europe, and the Americas, events now known as either banking or government debt crises often had elements of both. Some could have gone either way; policy and political choices determined their path. In all cases governments were as indispensable for resolving banking crises, as banks were for resolving sovereign debt crises. More recently, the feedback loop between bank and sovereign distress appears to have intensified, prompting calls for radical measures to break the bank-government link. Some of the measures proposed so far may adjust, elaborate, or displace the link; none would break it.
II. Banks or Governments
1.9
Accounts of banking crises start with a credit boom, where private institutions (perhaps operating under loose monetary conditions) make imprudent loans financed by fragile shortterm borrowing. 7 An economic downturn might deliver a shock to bank assets; market conditions might make it impossible for banks as a group to roll over maturing liabilities. Policy makers then face a choice: to let private losses fall where they may, to redistribute them among private actors, to absorb some losses on behalf of their taxpayers, or to make them a problem for another government.
A. Korea 1997
1.10 Korea's was a traditional banking crisis story. Its banks had borrowed from abroad to finance risky domestic corporate loan portfolios. When the currency crisis in Thailand and Indonesia spread to Korea in late 1997, the banks could not roll over their short-term debts to foreign financial institutions. As they repaid these foreign loans, the banks drained Korea's hard currency reserves. A blanket government guarantee of all bank liabilities failed to stem the outflow. At year-end, finance officials in Europe, Japan, and the United States had to cajole their banks to renew loans to Korean banks to avoid imminent default. own banks' exposure to Korea. 16 The story shifts easily from one of a private sector crisis and exceptional public intervention to one of long-term symbiosis and mutual assured destruction. It is also a transnational story, where governments across jurisdictions leverage their relationships with regulated institutions for the sake of financial stability.
1.14 A decade on, Korea's ability to cushion the fall of its banks looked unusual, almost quaint.
B. Iceland 2008
1.15 Between 2003 and 2007, Iceland-a country of about 300,000 inhabitants and an economy of about $12 billion-transformed from a fishing hub into a major international financial center. It had five main commercial banks, of which the three largest (accounting for 90% of the banking system) borrowed tens of billions of dollars short-term on the international capital markets. Unchecked by regulators, they amassed speculative and illiquid investments abroad.
In 2004-2006, these banks sought to diversify their funding sources and expand their retail deposit base. 17 Buoyed by permissive cross-border expansion rules in the European Economic Area, 18 they attracted deposits from a wide range of sources, including local governments in Britain and retirees in the Netherlands; however, the bulk of Icelandic bank funding still came from the wholesale capital markets. Bank assets grew from roughly equal to over ten times the size of the economy in just three years. More than half were abroad, but even assets in Iceland were nearly four times the size of the economy on the eve of the crisis. Over 80% of bank liabilities and just under 80% of their assets were denominated in foreign currencies.
19
1.16 When global financial markets collapsed in the fall of 2008, the currency fell by 40%, the banks could no longer refinance their debts, and were taken over by the government beginning October 6. The legislature enacted emergency measures authorizing the government to "ring fence" domestic assets and liabilities of the banking system, and retroactively granted depositors preference over other bank creditors. Fearing losses to U.K. depositors, the U.K. government famously invoked antiterrorism legislation to freeze Icelandic bank assets in the United Kingdom, accelerating wholesale collapse of the banking sector in Iceland. 20 Iceland's government fell shortly thereafter.
1.17 With the IMF's blessing, the authorities imposed capital controls and proceeded to restructure the banks. Some smaller ones were sold or liquidated; the largest were split along national lines. Three new banks established with government capital got the domestic assets and domestic liabilities; the old failed banks retained the foreign assets and liabilities. Domestic deposits received a blanket government guarantee. Some foreign creditors of the old banks were able to swap their debt into new bank equity. Government debt went from 30% to 120% of GDP, mostly owing to economic contraction from the crisis. 21 Net direct costs of bank restructuring have been estimated at about 20% of GDP, attributable in important part to central bank financing for the banking system on the eve of the crisis. 1.27 Regulation and supervision can help obscure-or soften-the impact of public debt problems on the financial sector. Where they applied in ordinary times, borrower concentration limits and activities restrictions might be suspended; asset values might perk up from a newly discovered accounting treatment; and wafer-thin capital cushions may be deemed good enough under the circumstances.
1.28 Argentina's last crisis offers a particularly rich case study of government debt in the banking system, and the way in which direct financial involvement by the government can interact with regulation on bank balance sheets.
A. Argentina 2001
1.29 To most outside observers, Argentina's government debt default in late 2001 subsumed and overshadowed its banking crisis. Quite apart from their exposure to sovereign credit risk, banks were vulnerable to the effects of economic contraction and currency depreciation: if the peso's 1:1 peg to the U.S. dollar broke down, bank borrowers' wealth would shrink, and their mammoth books of dollar loans would go into default. But the government presented a distinct source of danger for the banks.
1.30 At the height of the crisis, Argentina's public debt ratios were several times the size of Korea's or Iceland's. 37 Despite a succession of bank runs in the year before default, the government relied on domestic banks and pension funds, along with funding from the IMF, to fill its growing financing gap. Bank credit to the public sector doubled as foreign creditors ran for the hills, while credit to the private sector shrank. The $5.1 billion that Argentina borrowed from the IMF that year helped sustain the wobbling currency peg amid rampant capital flight: domestic depositors moved $16 billion offshore; short-term external creditors of the banks pulled another $13.4 billion.
38 Banks' sources of funding shrank, as their vulnerability to government default grew.
1.31 Argentina could have used IMF borrowing to cushion the impact of devaluation and public debt restructuring on local banks. 39 Instead, it gambled for resurrection, apparently at the banks' expense. By the end of 2001, the government needed bank holidays and capital controls to keep the remaining deposits in the banking system. After default, the government continued to use banks to cushion the effects of the crisis on other parts of the economy: for example, it converted dollar loans and deposits into pesos at asymmetric rates, so that bank owners faced a 40% gap between their assets and liabilities. It eventually filled the gap with new government bonds, which enjoyed favorable regulatory treatment and were serviced while foreign bonds remained in default. 40 The approach helped debtors; it also reflected the government's unwillingness to nationalize the banking system when bank owners threatened to walk away.
1.32 In sum, a depression, a currency collapse, and a government debt crisis together helped bring down Argentina's banks. Regulation and supervision allowed the government to finance itself from the banks when no other private creditors would lend to it. On the other hand, more regulatory forbearance and new government debt issued post-default kept the banking system on life support while the economy recovered, until deposits could be freed without risking a run. When the government was ready to restructure its foreign debt, domestic banks that held about half of it helped boost creditor participation.
1.33 In Korea, the government stood behind Korean banks and their foreign creditors. In Iceland and Argentina, foreign creditors of the banks and the sovereign, respectively, absorbed losses from the combined bank-government insolvency. In all cases, loss allocation was an iterative process involving multiple political actors, stretching over multiple regulatory cycles.
B. The Third World Debt Crisis1982
1.34 What came to be known as the "Third World debt crisis" of the 1980s could have-but did not-become the "First World banking crisis" to rival the Great Depression. Between August 1982 and October 1983, 28 governments from Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe suspended payments and initiated rescheduling talks over their obligations to commercial banks in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany, among others. In 1982, when Mexico initiated the wave of suspensions and restructurings, loans to the most heavily indebted governments represented over 130% of all capital in U.S. banks, 85% of all capital in British banks, and over 31% of all capital in German banks. 41 The nine largest U.S. banks were exposed to the tune of 194% of their capital; over 44% for Mexico alone.
1.35 Like other banking crises, this one originated with a credit bubble. The oil price shocks in the 1970s led to spikes in dollar revenues of energy-exporting countries, and a corresponding rise in "petrodollar deposits" in major financial center banks. The banks invested the deposits in high-yielding loans to governments and private sector borrowers in developing countries. In the early 1980s, a global recession and rising interest rates in the United States made it impossible for developing-country borrowers to refinance these dollar debts. At the same time, banks in major financial centers were under stress, their capital worn thin with recession, and their loan-loss provisions too low to absorb the looming defaults.
1.36 Sovereign debtors and their creditors' governments faced a dilemma: if the debtors defaulted or pursued debt principal reduction, major banks in the United States and Europe would have been exposed overnight as insolvent, potentially triggering deposit runs, economic and social dislocation in creditors' countries. If the banks' home governments and principal regulators had pursued early debt restructuring, they would have had to backstop their banks to mitigate the consequences. Instead, the creditors' governments helped broker negotiated arrangements with each debtor, whereby bank syndicates refinanced sovereign debts as if they were dealing with a temporary liquidity problem. The debtors also received financing from multilateral creditors and promised policy reform. Such arrangements had to be renegotiated frequently, adding to the sovereign debt stock: foreign bank claims on the most heavily indebted countries went up by nearly one third between 1982 and 1987, while economic growth stagnated. Over the same period, banks in New York, London and Frankfurt were rebuilding capital and provisions. signaled major policy change on loss allocation. 43 His initiative led to restructuring agreements with substantial principal reduction, led again by Mexico, including the forgiveness in total of some $60 billion in debt, 44 much of which fell on banks and their shareholders. 45 Debt relief was conditioned on dramatic economic reforms including largescale privatization and liberalization in many developing countries.
1.38 The delay in principal reductions and the resulting long-term costs for debtors' economies was a function of many complex factors. However, there is little doubt that the health of leading international commercial banks was a key factor in treating the crisis as one of temporary borrower illiquidity. The burden of debt distress initially fell on the debtors in the form of higher debt stocks and domestic economic adjustment, and only later on the banks in the form of debt write-offs. As in other crises, loss allocation among banks and governments took multiple iterations ofregulatory forbearance, public financing, and inter-government negotiation.
III. Back to Europe (The Doom Loop)
1.39 The Eurozone crisis has made the distinction between banking and public debt crises hard to sustain. The combination of very large national banking sectors, strained fiscal resources, financial integration, and the inability of national governments to print money have made it virtually impossible for member states to contain crises in their banks or limit the impact of government debt distress on the banking systems. 46 Persistent home bias in sovereign debt holdings helped make national banking systems in the most vulnerable member states especially exposed to their governments' debt distress. 47 However, banks can fall victim to their sovereigns' debt problems even where they do not hold too much of their government's debt: to the extent markets counted on national governments to back their banks, weak public finances showed among other things diminished capacity to support the banking sector. 48 An early and stark illustration of the loop dynamic came from Ireland. 
Conclusions
1.43
The case studies in this essay illustrate some ways in which bank-government links operate in crisis. Three themes recur. First, banks and governments appear to be indispensable partners in one another's crises. The relationship holds with or without "twin" bankgovernment crises, which are rare, and apart from the feedback "doom loop." In particular, bank and government liabilities seem to migrate easily between bank and government books as the crisis deepens, and as part of its resolution. Second and related, private bank balance sheets emerge as public policy conduits. Japan and Korea highlight the fact that this function is not limited to crisis; however, it becomes particularly stark in crisis. Banks sprout new assets and liabilities, which might be valued in brand new ways in the name of financial stability. Third, when banks are internationally active, they come to mediate distribution of losses among governments. Governments want private creditors to bear the consequences of their risk-taking, but feel compelled to shield their own nationals, and try to get other governments to pick up the tab.
1.44 Policy response to this abiding link between banks and governments is a mix of palliative and denial. It starts with a story of the relationship as a symptom of under-development and crisis, one of aberration and redemption. Reforms are then sold as projects for getting banks off government dole and getting governments out of banking-as in the Dodd-Frank Act's promise that taxpayers "shall bear no losses" from bailing out insolvent banks, 54 and the European banking union's "imperative to break the vicious cycle between banks and sovereigns."
55 Such statements are misleading at best: Dodd-Frank elaborates the process by which governments may support a broader range of financial institutions, while Europe substitutes the regional government for national ones in the bank-government marriage. Both try to limit government support for financial institutions and other governments, and to raise its price ex ante. This is renegotiation, not divorce-and properly so, since attempts to renounce bailouts by rule have yet to survive a crisis.
56 Still, there remains the relationship that dare not speak its name.
1.45 Acknowledging the pervasive and enduring nature of bank-government ties reframes the policy task. Instead of outlawing bailouts, the focus shifts to the precise terms of loss-sharing between banks and governments, and among governments, in crisis -and the incentive effects of this allocation in good times. Decisions about the terms of the bargain must be intelligible to the public and democratically accountable, if only because of their enormous consequences for distribution, in good times and bad. The democratic imperative in turn raises a host of research and policy questions. For example, to what extent should government promises of support for banks-and banks' tacit backing of governments-be made explicit on bank and government balance sheets? Should bank and government claims on one another occupy a special place in the claims hierarchy-and if yes, what should that place be? Should regulatory privileges for government debt be abolished-or made more explicit and institutionalized? Considering the limits on the enforcement of government promises (amply demonstrated elsewhere in this volume), what is the right commitment device to ensure that governments deliver on their promises of debt repayment, liquidity support, and recapitalization-and that banks pay a fair price for the benefits they receive? How might government commitments to one another (for example, to share losses in crossborder bank resolution) fare in such a newly transparent regime? And how might the answers to such questions affect the structure of the financial sector, and the behavior of banks and governments going forward?
1.46 The answers are far beyond the scope of this essay. For now, describing the bankgovernment relationship with its cross-border dimensions as something other than an aberration to be stamped out or swept under the rug might prompt a more humble look at crisis management and regulation. Reforming the relationship to limit its worst dysfunctions, and to render it intelligible and accountable to the public in whose name it exists, will take more than official declarations. Harnessing its stabilizing potential is an even bigger challenge. "Walking back from Cyprus" will take a while-and, on the bright side, many more drafts in Arial 12. 
